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WE OWE  a considerable  debt of gratitude  to Sidney  Weintraub,  Henry 
Wallich,  Laurence  Seidman,  and Arthur  Okun for developing  the con- 
cept of the tax-based  incomes  policy (TIP), and for keeping  it alive in 
the face of public and professional  disinterest.  I believe that the papers 
and discussion  of this conference  have greatly  advanced  our understand- 
ing of the implications  of the proposal,  even  if they  have  not answered  all 
questions  nor, I am sure,  produced  general  agreement  even in this room. 
Among economists,  just as among other groups,  there is and will be 
opposition  to TIP by those who oppose in principle  any incomes  policy. 
I am regarded-correctly, I suppose-as  one who is skeptical about 
TIPs.1  But it surely  is not because  I am opposed to incomes  policies in 
principle.  I first  publicly  called for such a policy in the 1958 Joint Eco- 
nomic  Committee  study  on the relationship  of prices  to economic  stability 
and growth.2  I have supported  the use of an incomes  policy ever since, 
and  have repeatedly  urged  that such a policy be established  during  every 
subsequent  period  in which  it was not in use. I suppose  my participation 
in administering  and  defending  the guidepost  policy of the 1960s equaled 
or exceeded  both in duration  and intensity  that of any other  person;  and 
it reflected  an enthusiastic  personal  commitment.  I accept  the analysis  in 
George  Perry's  paper  for this  conference  as fully consistent  with a general 
1. Gardner Ackley,  "Okun's New  Tax-Based Incomes-Policy Proposal," Eco- 
nomic Outlook, USA, vol. 5 (Winter 1978), pp. 8-9. 
2.  Gardner  Ackley, "A Third Approach  to the Analysis and Control of Inflation," 
in The Relationship of Prices to Economic Stability and Growth, Compendium  of 
Papers Submitted by Panelists Appearing before the Joint Economic Committee, 
March 31, 1958, 85:2 (Government Printing  Office, 1958), pp. 619-36. 
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view  of the iniflationary  process  that  I have held and  promoted  for twenty 
years  or more,  and  I regard  the paper  as providing  a fully adequate  theo- 
retical  and  empirical  basis  for an economist  to support  an incomes  policy. 
Thus,  in my view, the question  is not whether  to use an incomes  policy 
but only what  kind to use. There are numerous  models, of which I may 
perhaps  usefully  delineate  three. I elimninate  a fourth (compulsory  con- 
trols) as far too costly in economic,  administrative,  political,  and moral 
terms. 
The first  model  is that of an incomes  policy enforced  by "jawboning" 
and  related  forms  of education,  pressure,  and  persuasion,  which  centered 
in the White  House during  the period  1962-68. From  what  I know  or can 
assume  about  the plans  of the Carter  administration,  its present  intention 
regarding  an incomes policy conforms  essentially  to that model. To be 
sure, the basic standard-"deceleration"-is  considerably  more vague 
than the Kennedy-Johnson  guideposts;  and it is not clear that the pol- 
icy commands  even as much genuine administration  commitment  as it 
did in the 1960s. On the other  hand,  the Council  on Wage  and  Price  Sta- 
bility should supply  considerably  more and better staff support  than we 
ever  had. 
I have  previously  outlined  what  I regard  as the principal  weaknesses  of 
the jawboning  model.3  They include (1)  the absence  of any significant 
"legitimacy"  for the policy in the eyes of those most affected, either 
through  the actual involvement  of leaders  from the business and labor 
communities  in advisory  or policymaking  roles, or through  any  legislative 
basis for the program;4  (2)  the personal  identification  of the program 
with the President,  which  has disadvantages  both to the program  and to 
the presidency  that I regard  as greatly outweighing  the advantages  to 
either; (3)  the inevitable  highly adversary  character  of the procedure; 
(4)  the rather  hit-or-miss  application,  primarily  to cases that happen  to 
draw  government  or public  attention;  and (5) the adherence  of a firm  or 
a union  to such a policy that rests  on the acceptance  of a social or politi- 
cal responsibility  contrary  to economic  interest.  To be sure,  if participa- 
tion were  general,  the actual  cost to each  might  be negligible.  Even so, the 
paradox  is that the greater  the general  participation,  the greater  the indi- 
vidual  economic  advantage  in nonparticipation.  I do not consider  this as 
a necessarily  fatal defect;  but it must  be recognized  as a weakness. 
3. For example, in Gardner  Ackley, "An Incomes Policy for the 1970's,"  Review 
of Economics  and Statistics,  vol. 54 (August 1972), pp. 218-23. 
4. The Council on Wage and Price Stability now at least has a legislative basis. Symposium  509 
The TIP model avoids  many  of these  disadvantages.  Its necessary  con- 
gressional  mandate  gives it political  legitimacy;  labor and business  lead- 
ers  have  the opportunity  to become  involved  at least during  the legislative 
stage; the presidency  is not demeaned  by brawling  confrontation  with 
firms and unions. Rather, each private  group makes its own decisions, 
taking account  of costs and benefits,  and there is no arbitrary  or acci- 
dental selection of cases (except through  legislative action to exempt 
areas  of the economy  from  coverage  or to provide  special  treatment). 
On the other  hand, as the papers  and discussions  indicate,  TIP has its 
own problems.  I am convinced  that a price-TIP  would  be an administra- 
tive nightmare.  Yet the politics of "wage  control  without  price control" 
may  require  that  we accept  some  control  on prices  if we want  to have  TIP 
at all, as Albert Rees and others  have pointed out. Moreover,  the over- 
whelming  econometric  evidence  that  prices  follow wages  is demonstrated 
only at the macro  level, not for firms  and industries.  The public  may not 
understand  the benefit  of wage restraint,  or wish to tolerate  it, if the re- 
straint  in particular  cases is or appears  to be appropriated  by particular 
employers. This I  believe to be the key to union opposition to in- 
comes policies. I am impressed  with several of Rees' points about the 
difficulties  of TIP when an employer  deals with several  unions or when 
a union deals with an industry.  Indeed, I raised some of these same 
questions. 
I am troubled  by the necessary  choice  between  the greater  effectiveness 
of a continuous,  penalty-TIP  on wages (which Seidman's  paper  demon- 
strates) and the far greater administrative  costs, public and private, 
which  such a program  entails (shown in the paper  by Larry  Dildine and 
Emil Sunley  and in comments  by Richard  Slitor). On the basis of previ- 
ous experience  with wage and price legislation,  I think  we must be pre- 
pared to assume  that each special interest-and  this policy will touch 
them all-will  press  for special  provisions  to protect  that interest,  either 
in the initial legislation  or in subsequent  amendments.  Such legislative 
provisions  can destroy  the effectiveness  of the policy or create  an admin- 
istrative  monstrosity,  or both, as has happened  in the past with  price and 
wage controls. (This is also a well-established  characteristic  of tax legis- 
lation.) 
In my view, the chief administrative  problem  is not tax evasion  or even 
cheating,  but rather that, say, one-half of the 1 percent of the firms 
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unfair.5  Perhaps  10 percent  of these complaints  cannot  be dismissed  out 
of hand.  If coverage  is substantial-certainly  close to universal-this one- 
twentieth  of 1 percent  of firms  means the administering  agency  and the 
Congress  must spend millions of man-hours  to develop some remedies. 
And if either  the agency  or the Congress  modifies  the regulation  or the 
legislation  to handle a case, that almost  certainly  creates  new problems 
or opportunities  for others. 
My judgment  is that if the TIP model could at least be confined  to 
wages,  which may not be politically  feasible, it is clearly preferable  to 
the jawboning  model of incomes  policy. This is with the understanding, 
as James  Duesenberry  argued,  that TIP is regarded  only as a part of a 
continuing  effort  to build  a consensus  in support  of mutual  restraint. 
There  is, however,  a third  possible  model, based primarily  on volun- 
tarism  and persuasion,  which might be preferable  to TIP. I have de- 
scribed  it elsewhere,6  and  will not repeat  it here, except  to indicate  that it 
includes (1)  a highly selective coverage  of both wages and prices; (2) 
a legislatively established administrative  agency with certain limited 
powers to require  reporting  and to delay increases  that are above the 
standard;  (3)  essential  independence  from the White House; and (4) 
fairly elaborate  formal arrangements  for the advisory involvement  of 
representatives  of labor,  business,  and  the public.  The administrative  (as 
opposed to the legislative) character  of this model more easily permits 
ad hoc adjustments  to avoid the various kinds of efficiency  losses our 
discussion  has noted. And it accommodates  Rees' observation  about  the 
desirability (on  occasion)  of  having incomes policy  administrators 
"help  in the settlement  of actual or potential  disputes  in collective  bar- 
gaining  or in the improvement  of collective  bargaining  structures." 
My proposal  describing  this  third  model  has been in the public  domain 
for a considerable  period  and has attracted  little interest,  which  probably 
indicates  that it is fatally flawed.  I refer to it only to point out that the 
choice is not between jawboning  and TIP, or nothing. Social inven- 
tion has been badly  needed  in this area and,  while TIP is an outstanding 
candidate,  there  may  be still other  possibilities  or variants  of an incomes 
policy that wouLld  be  either economically and administratively  more 
efficient  or politically  more  attractive. 
5. By "unfair"  I mean that there is an alternative,  plausible  way to apply the gen- 
eral principle  involved that would be more favorable to the complaining  firm. 
6. See "An Incomes Policy for the 1970's,"  pp. 222-23. Symposium  511 
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I HAVE  NEVER  been persuaded  that incomes  policies,  if that term can be 
generalized,  can work for any protracted  period of time or leave any 
permanent  effect  on the wage and price  structure.  Nonetheless,  it is clear 
that  the TIP proposals  try  to confront  some of the basic  problems  of most 
incomes policies. 
Because there  is a great  deal of incentive-whether carrot  or stick- 
involved  in the TIP proposals,  they are assumed  to simulate  market  pro- 
cesses in many  respects.  Thus, if TIP were not employed  as a substitute 
for conventional  fiscal and monetary  policies, some anti-inflation  impact 
might  be achieved.  Certainly  in the abstract,  as the model developed  by 
Laurence  Seidman  illustrates,  it is not difficult  to construct  fairly  general 
conditions  in which  TIP would appear  to have some marginal  advantage. 
The difficulty  I have  had and  still have, especially  after  these  meetings, 
is that, while we can construct  a simplified  model in which a tax-based 
incomes  policy could work, the abstraction  can never fully capture  the 
complexity  of a TIP in application.  On this point I find  myself  in agree- 
ment  with Joseph  Pechman.  No one questions  that we are dealing  with a 
problem  in which administration  is difficult.  But is that difficulty  merely 
something  that could be overcome  with operational  experience,  or are 
we confronted  with an issue in which  the complexity  of administration  is 
its fatal  flaw? 
I suspect there is no solution to the administrative  problem. Larry 
Dildine and Emil Sunley  did an excellent  job on their paper.  However, 
it strikes  me that they barely scratched  the surface  of the problems  we 
would  confront  with a TIP in full-scale  operation.  Those  problems  would 
not be significantly  different  from the administrative  nightmare  of our 
wage-price  control experience  that occurred after August 1971. What 
structk  me about  that  period  was the inconceivable  complexity  of what  the 
controllers  were attempting  to do, firm  by firm,  product  by product,  wage 
by wage, and how the entire  process held together,  largely  because the 
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There  was an accusation  at the time that the administrators  who ran 
the control  program  did not have their  heart  in it and, therefore,  the pro- 
gram  could  not be successful.  In fact, every  time  they attempted  to make 
the control  system  work-in  the sense  of trying  to prevent  companies  and 
unions  from  doing what  they would ordinarily  do-the  program  ran  into 
extraordinary  problems,  and the controllers  backed  away. 
One important  aspect of Phases II and III of the control  program  to 
remember  is that although  price and cost data were submitted  in detail, 
they  were  never  appropriately  audited.  There  was no effort  to actively  ad- 
minister  the program.  It was de facto a voluntary  program  characterized 
by a huge  paper  flow,  frenetic  committee  meetings,  and  vague  pronounce- 
ments. It was fundamentally  wheel-spinning.  But if TIP were imple- 
mented,  legislation  would  require  auditing  and  verification  of the elements 
of the system  to the same  degree  that  our  tax system  is audited.  This  would 
create an  insurmountable  administrative  problem. Litigation would 
quickly  swamp  the courts  and make  TIP politically  infeasible  almost  im- 
mediately.  That does not mean it may not be tried. There is a growing 
sense of desperation  that could easily  trigger  risk-laden  policy initiatives. 
If the cost of a failure  of this type of program  were zero, or there were 
only inconveniences  associated  with it, there  would be no reason  not to 
try. At worst, we would end up with an administrative  mess but with 
no permanent  damage.  However,  there  are  significant  costs  to every  policy 
failure;  and in constructing  policy initiatives,  it is essential  to be aware 
of what  happens  if the policy initiative  goes wrong.  That  is certainly  true 
of fiscal  and  monetary  policies. 
If a TIP were tried,  judging  from  what  has happened  during  past con- 
trol programs,  the participants  would rapidly  learn how to beat the sys- 
tem. Because it would be almost physically  impossible  to maintain  an 
appropriate  audit of wages and prices, the extent of avoidance,  if not 
evasion,  would become  far greater  than anything  even remotely  contem- 
plated  in the income tax system.  This could be quite disruptive  to eco- 
nomic policy. 
In the case of TIP, even if it failed, we would still have in place a cor- 
trol-oriented  bureaucracy,  and I fear the political pressures  that would 
emerge  to employ  it. When government  in effect considers  certain  price 
or wage  relationships  appropriate  and a quasi-voluntary  program  falls to 
induce  them,  there  is strong  political  pressure  to mandate  them. 
Obviously,  to the extent  that a TIP program  is narrowed  and lim'ited, Symposium  513 
the problems  I outlined  above  are also narrowed.  Thus, a TIP based  on a 
limited  form of the stick approach  that was restricted  to wages and to 
large  companies  would only sharply  reduce administrative  and auditing 
requirements.  Those requirements  would still be voluminous  and fraught 
with  problems-many of them  unforeseeable-but it is unlikely  that the 
system  would be swamped  by them. However,  to the extent that TIP is 
narrowed,  whatever  positive benefits are expected in theory would be 
lost. It is difficult  to make an effective  judgment  a priori  on the trade- 
off between  administrative  simplicity  and anti-inflation  benefits.  My sus- 
picion  is, however,  that the impact  on wages from a limited  program  is 
likely  to be much  too small  to be worth  implementing.  For even a limited 
TIP is a large  program  that would entail administrative  burdens.  Unless 
there  is a reasonable  expectation  of a significant  anti-inflation  payoff,  it 
is difficult  to make  a case for going  ahead  with even a limited  TIP. 
That  is not to say I see a simple  solution  to the current  type of chronic 
inflation.  I am not persuaded  a 6 or 7 percent  inflation  rate cannot be 
changed  and that the unwinding  that began in 1975 and lasted through 
late 1976 is necessarily  over. If it is, I would be gravely  concerned  that 
some form of unsuspected  capacity  restraint  is being created. At this 
stage,  it would seem that it is still possible  to continue  unwinding  the in- 
flationary  pressures,  provided  that reasonable  macropolicies  are main- 
tained.  I think  it is much  too soon to throw  in the sponge  on macropolicy, 
especially  if TIP is being  considered  as the alternative. 
This  conference  has made  a great  contribution  toward  airing  a number 
of the problems  confronting  TIP. But it may be even more  complex  than 
those  of us who have been involved  in similar  undertakings  suspect  and, 
hence,  more  analysis  is needed.  I am most concerned  that  the administra- 
tive  problems  will be dismissed  too easily.  If that occurs,  some very seri- 
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IT IS SOMEWHAT  embarrassing  to follow two speakers  who have had a 
lot to do with setting  up price controls,  managing  them, and seeing  them 
from  the inside. My only claim to being here is that in testimony  before 
Congress  in 1971, following an appeal  by Kenneth  Galbraith  for price 
controls,  I strongly  urged  Congress  to avoid  price  controls  and suggested 
that if it were really serious about controlling  inflation  it should con- 
sider an approach  that accomplishes  the same objectives  but is much 
simpler. 
The approach  recommended  was basically  a variant  of the Weintraub- 
Wallich plan. It relied on the general principle that the law decides 
which expenses are deductible  in the computation  of taxes. Wage in- 
creases  in excess  of some  established  guideposts  would  not be a deductible 
expense  for the purpose  of calculating  profits.  In effect, wage increases 
granted  over and above  the guideposts  would  come entirely  out of the net 
after-tax  profits,  instead  of 48 percent  being  paid  by the Treasury. 
One could also think  of a more  sophisticated  taxation  scheme  in which 
an excess  profits  tax is imposed  on the increase  of profit  margins  per dol- 
lar  of sale above  some  base  period,  but without  allowing  the deduction  of 
wages  in excess of the agreed  amount  in computing  the profit  margin. 
Let me begin by stating  that it seems  to me that TIP, no matter  what 
form it takes, should be considered  only for the purpose of breaking 
momentum  inflation,  a theory that Perry has described  so well in his 
paper.  He has shown that the source of current  inflation  is largely  mo- 
mentum.  If that  momentum  could  be broken,  most  people  would  be better 
off,  and  no one  would  be worse  off. 
Inflation  can be very costly or only moderately  costly. But certainly  it 
is costly  in practice.  At the same time, there is no question  in my mind 
that  TIP has distortive  effects.  The best possible TIP, including  that of 
Lerner,  still has some disruptive  effects.  Accordingly,  a transitional  TIP 
might  be best. 
I agree  with Alan Greenspan  that inflation  is probably  still declining Symposium  515 
in response  to high  unemployment.  Inflation  may  fluctuate,  but it is prob- 
ably on the expected  declining  course.  Because  the effects  of unemploy- 
ment are slow and systematic,  the inflation  rate could bounce up after  a 
year or two in which  unemployment  declined  fairly  fast. But nonetheless, 
the process via unemployment  is extremely  costly and painful. If there 
is another  disruption  from any source,  more  restrictive  fiscal  policies  will 
follow.  These  issues  ought  to be  faced. 
Almost everyone  participating  in the discussion  seems to agree that 
TIP, although  perhaps  not the ideal answer,  is better  than controls.  The 
bleak  picture  that  Alan Greenspan  has described  in managing  price con- 
trols is something  I have seen on many occasions  when I lived through 
many price-control  experiences  in Italy. My doctoral dissertation  was 
about  Italian  price  controls  in 1935. They were a nightmare. 
What  we really  have to control  is wages.  But politically  it is very diffi- 
cult to do that  without  also controlling  prices.  In fact, it probably  cannot 
be done. That is why I think  TIP is really  promising-because it can be 
applied  fundamentally  to wages,  possibly  with some reinforcement  from 
an excess  profits tax.  There are,  as we  have  seen,  two  basic  kinds of 
TIPs, the carrot  TIP and the stick TIP. From the point of view of its 
appeal,  the carrot  TIP is far superior.  Arthur  Okun should be given a 
great  deal of credit  for developing  a concept that in principle  is highly 
attractive  for many  reasons.  Like the stick,  the carrot  is easier  to apply  to 
wages  than  to prices.  But I have  doubts  about  feasibility  because,  as most 
seem to agree,  reward  must  be uiniversal.  The government  cannot  treat  a 
large  firm  and a small  firm  differently  and provide  one with the incentive 
and  not the other.  It has to be universal,  and  if it is going  to be universal, 
it runs  into the problems  that Joseph  Pechman  has described  quite  well. 
In my view, the enforcement  problems,  which  may be severe  even for 
large firms,  are worse for small firms.  Thus, if the employee  of a small 
firm  is promoted  and receives  a higher  wage, the firm  exceeds  the target. 
Every  small  firm will have  a similar  problem.  Employees  would  be chang- 
ing positions,  and there  would  be no way of formimg  a base. Think  of the 
new employee  at a firm  that  has already  granted  large  wage  increases.  He 
does not receive  the benefit  of the tax rebate,  even though  he himself  did 
not have an increase  in wages.  I think  that the horror  stories  are almost 
unlimited.  The problem  of administration  would seem nearly  impossible. 
Then there  is the stick  TIP. This approach  could work  through  higher 
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through  the nondeductibility  of wages,  which  is the proposal  I have  made. 
But I have to modify that claim. After I made that proposal, Senator 
Proxmire  asked me to investigate  whether  anything  like that had ever 
existed.  I then  turned  to Cary  Brown,  who pointed  out that during  World 
War  II there was a provision  that allowed the Treasury  to disallow de- 
ductibility  of wages in excess of wage control. So there is a historical 
precedent,  and  that  is one great  advantage.' 
Of course,  there are problems  of enforcement  with my proposal,  too. 
I would  support  Okun's  suggestion  to let firms  decide  at the beginning  of 
the period  how they will classify  workers.  Let them decide  whether  they 
want to report  by per capita,  by standardized  classes, or by any similar 
system.  We do not need to strive  for perfection  if we rely on TIP as a 
temporary  program,  by which  we aim  to lower  inflation  by, say, 1 percent 
a year for three consecutive  years, and then call a halt to the program, 
cutting  our losses. And let us be sure that at the time we dismantle  the 
program,  we have not reached an unemployment  rate that is too low. 
Otherwise,  we immediately  re-create  a problem.  Thus, the enforcement 
problems  do not strike  me as totally  insoluble,  although  I agree  with  Alan 
Greenspan  that once we have settled  on one of these methods,  we should 
explore  it further. 
One problem  that would arise is obtaining  the cooperation  of labor. 
What  we heard  from  Albert  Rees is discouraging;  however,  his comments 
focused on the Wallich and Weintraub  approach.  For the purpose of 
catching  the public's  attention,  Wallich  referred  to his approach  as back- 
boning  rather  than jawboning.  But that is the wrong  way to present  the 
case to the public and to labor-as  a plan that  would  force employers  to 
stand  up against  labor. 
Another  way to say  it is: here  is a program  to reduce  inflation  that  uses 
the guidelines  that  have been established,  and everyone  has an interest  in 
sticking  to it. We want to put some public disapproval  on those who do 
not stick to it by attaching  certain penalties. That places all the em- 
phasis  on cooperation,  and  none at all on backboning.  We must  minimize 
the extent  of violations.  But we could agree  that if people want  to violate 
the  principle,  they  may  have good reasons,  and  they  may  pay the penalty. 
Nonetheless,  it should  be made  clear  that  the intent  and  purpose  is not 
1. U.S. Bureau of Internal Revenue, Regulations 111, Subpart  B, sec. 29.23(a)- 
16, published  in U.S. Treasury  Department,  Regulations 111 Relating to the Income 
Tax (Government  Printing  Office, 1943). Symposium  517 
at all to impose the burden  of slowing  inflation  on labor through  lower 
real wages.  The goal is to benefit  everybody.  Since  the response  of prices 
to wages should be fast, inflation  will slow down. There may be a little 
lag. When  wages are rising  at only 6 percent,  prices  may be rising  more 
than  4 percent,  but the two variables  ought  to be declining  close together. 
I think  that  is the  sort  of thing  that  has  to be emphasized. 
However, there are still other problems. One is that the proposal 
sounds like an antilabor  approach.  Second, it is applied only to wages 
and not to prices.  And there  is a third  aspect: there  might  be a tendency 
for the penalty  on increases  in wages  to be transferred  into higher  prices. 
Because the excessive wage settlement  costs the firm much more, TIP 
might  have this effect.  From this point of view, there  is much to be said 
for combining  the nondeductibility  of excess wage increases with an 
excess  profits  tax on the profit  margin  above  some level. In that case, it is 
highly  unlikely  that the firm  will find it to its advantage  to pass on the 
higher  cost in higher  prices.  That  would  be a guarantee  for labor  that  they 
are  protected  against  an expansion  of profit  margins. 
This system should be applied  fundamentally  to a small number  of 
firms,  say, 2,000 as an arbitrary  number.  That  it can be applied  to a small 
number  of firms  is a helpful  point of departure.  There  is, to be sure, the 
risk that as we approach  full employment,  the greatest  push may come 
from the low-wage  workers  in small firms.  That is a problem, and we 
should not press too hard  for full employment.  There may be a way to 
combine  coverage  of firms  employing  more than X people with that of 
unions  representing  more  than  Y people.  Such  unions  may  deal  with  many 
firms,  and  penalties  would  be applied  at the level of the firm. 
Let me conclude  by stating  some of the main  problems  of a TIP. One 
area  of concern  is the administration  problems  that  we have heard  about 
from  the experts,  particularly  the legal and  management  aspects.  It seems 
to me another  serious problem  is starting  out. In the beginning,  some 
people will have had a recent  increase  in wages, and others  will not have 
had  one for  three  years;  that  raises  the  issue  of equity. 
That is a tough problem,  and I have learned a great deal about this 
from Gardner  Ackley on a recent occasion when he talked about the 
efforts  to mainltain  equity  in a program  of this kind. The problem  would 
probably  be alleviated  if the average  wage of the three years preceding 
the program  were  used as a base from which  to compute  allowable  wage 
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I have already  mentioned  the distortive  effects.  I believe that any TIP 
will have such effects  beside the desired  effect of slowing  inflation.  It is 
important  to be aware  of this, and try to dismantle  any such program  as 
fast as possible. 
I am inclined  to disagree  with Alan Greenspan's  pessimism  about  the 
possible effect of failure of this policy. I do not understand  why there 
should  be pressure  on the political  system.  The experience  we had at the 
end of Phase IV was that everybody  was fed up with it, even those who 
had been in favor of it. Only four years later those failures  seem to be 
forgotten! 
I am not impressed  with the argument  that TIP would create  evasion 
pressure.  Evasion pressure  assumes  that firms are eager to pay higher 
wages. It seems to me that pressure  to evade is questionable,  because  it 
provides  a basis on which the firm  can stand.  It supplies  an "objective" 
figure  for the firm, at which it can say, "That  is the point at which we 
stop." 
In the end, I think  a TIP design  based on a stick approach  with a lim- 
ited number of firms-possibly  my proposal or something similar- 
deserves  further  consideration.  Certainly  this conference  has persuaded 
me that all forms of TIP, including  my own version, are not as alluring 
as they once seemed.  But reliance  on unemployment  still appears  to me 
to be even  less alluring. Comments 
and  Discussion 
Henry  C. Wallich: Of course,  nobody  likes TIP per se. It is really  a ques- 
tion of the alternatives.  We are running  out of good options and have to 
look at choices among unattractive  ones. The discussion of this con- 
ference  has brought  up a number  of important  points,  some  of which  have 
caused  me to change  my  mind  about  various  issues. 
For instance,  I am no longer  persuaded  that the income tax is neces- 
sarily  the best tax through  which  to levy a penalty.  Perhaps  disallowance 
of excess  wage  increases,  despite  the possible  adverse  shifting  effects,  is a 
more meaningful  and manageable  procedure.  There  is a precedent  for it 
in the  tax  code. 
In addition,  I am no longer  convinced  that TIP must  be widespread  in 
its coverage.  Perhaps  the top 2,000 firms  would be the appropriate  uni- 
verse  with  which  to deal in order  to simplify  the administrative  problems. 
I have also acquired  some doubts as to the fixity of the link between 
prices  and  wages.  If a plan  is to be at all acceptable  to labor,  that  relation- 
ship needs to be demonstrated  more firmly both at the empirical  and 
the theoretical  level. But there  are  ways of overcoming  the doubts  and  re- 
assuring  labor against the danger of runaway  profits. If those profits 
should  tend to go above some benchmark  level, one could impose  a sur- 
charge  on the corporate  profits  tax that  would  stabilize  the share  of profits 
in the GNP. Such a surcharge  would not be an excess profits  tax on any 
single company  but one on the entire corporate  sector, including  high 
earners  and  low earners. 
At one time  I thought  TIP should  be terminated  as quickly  as possible. 
But the possibility  of reducing  the natural  rate of unemployment  strikes 
me as an important  point  in favor  of a TIP of longer  duration.  I feel that 
Laurence  Seidman's  argument  on this  matter  is fairly  clear  and  persuasive. 
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If TIP could  lower  inflation,  that  benefit  could be used to lower  inflation 
at the existing  natural  rate  of unemployment,  hold inflation  constant  at a 
lower  natural  rate, or something  in between,  as long as TIP remained  in 
force  aind  its guideline  were lowered  year  by year. 
Finally, I am gratified  that the discussion  here has been largely be- 
tween  those who would favor some form of TIP and those who are gen- 
erally  skeptical  about it. It is important  that the various  proponents  of 
the different  schemes  have not argued  against  each other,  but rather  have 
tried  to develop  the implications  of the alternative  approaches  to see how 
something  viable could be best constructed.  Nothing  is ever enacted  the 
way it is first  proposed.  The need at this point is to keep the discussion 
going. If I could push a button to make a proposed  TIP go into effect 
now, I would  not push  that  button;  but  I would  urge  strongly  that  we con- 
tinue  to examine  this  type  of proposal. 
Arthur  M. Oku:  I see an urgent  need to develop  new strategies  against 
inflation  because  the outlook  on the present  scenario  is extremely  bleak. 
I believe  that  inflation  has already  accelerated  a little above  the 6 percent 
plateau  of recent  years.  That movement  stems,  not from excess demand, 
but from an inevitable  catch-up  in nonunion  wage rates, a gradual  adap- 
tation  of private  decisionmaking  to the higher  secular  inflation  rate, and 
an  addictive  attachment  by the government  to cost-raising  measures-just 
the opposite  of the constructive  course  that Robert Crandall  outlined  in 
his  paper.  I wish  I could  share  Franco  Modigliani's  and  Alan Greenspan's 
brighter  view of the economic  outlook.  In my judgment,  inflation  will next 
decelerate  only when unemployment  rises and, in light of the current 
stance of monetary  policy, probably  during  a recession. Of course, as 
George  Perry  highlighted  in his paper,  recession  will slow inflation,  but 
only at the absurd  cost in production  of roughly  $200 billion per point. 
Faced by costs of that magnitude  from recession,  our society is chal- 
lenged  to find some mechanism  for a mutual  deescalation  of wages and 
prices  in prosperity.  When  our common  interests  so clearly  outweigh  the 
conflicting  interests  of various groups, the ability of the nation to lick 
stagflation  is a serious  test of our democratic  political  process, and not 
merely  a question  of our ability  to find  the right  unemployment  rate.  TIP 
and the cost-reducing  strategy,  focusing on reductions  of payroll and 
excise  taxes,  are a route  to mutual  deescalation  without  recession. 
I have no deep substantive  convictions  about the relative  merits  of a Symposium  521 
reward  TIP and a penalty TIP. I first tried to promote  interest  in the 
Wallich-Weintraub  plan in 1973; many  people who were sympathetic  to 
its objectives  regarded  it as inequitable  and hence politically  unaccept- 
able. Because of that reaction,  I sought  to convert  the stick to a carrot. 
To be fair to workers  in fact, a penalty  TIP on wages  needs some indem- 
nification  for the first  year,  when,  according  to the empirical  evidence,  the 
slowdown  in prices  would be likely to lag behind  a slowdown  of wages. 
To be fair to workers  in image, however, a penalty TIP needs further 
modifications;  I believe  that some of the suggestions  made  at this confer- 
ence  may  point  the way. 
If a penalty  TIP were incorporated  into proposed  legislation,  I would 
support  it enthusiastically.  Nonetheless,  I am  convinced  that  a reward  TIP 
belongs  on our list of promising  options.  Unquestionably,  rewards  must 
be offered  universally to employees  of small firms  as well as large ones. 
Undoubtedly,  universal  coverage  adds to administrative  burdens,  but, I 
would  insist,  to only a limited  degree.  The same set of rules  must  be pre- 
pared  on how to evaluate  compensation  whether  the program  applies  to 
a handful  or a myriad  of firms.  In this connection,  as Richard  Slitor  sug- 
gested,  the present  rules  developed  for the income  tax-on  such  issues  as 
pension  funding,  stock options, and health insurance-are entirely  ade- 
quate  for a TIP, whether  its coverage  is narrow  or universal.  If they are 
good enough  for a universal  tax under  which corporations  pay 48 cents 
per  dollar,  they  are  good enough  to handle  a marginal  increment  or decre- 
ment  in the tax rate.  The only enforcement  of any penalty  or reward  TIP 
would  operate  by auditing  tax returns,  rather  than  by monitoring  behavior 
or requiring  advance  approval  of action.  If the low-probability  threat  of 
audit  is a reasonably  effective  way to make  all firms  comply  with  the pro- 
visions for depreciation,  the investment  tax credit, expense allowances, 
and all the other complex  features  of our income tax, then it should be 
good enough  for a reward  TIP. Obviously,  a universal  program  would 
raise  more inquiries  from  taxpayers,  necessitate  more  mailing,  and hence 
require  a larger staff at the Internal  Revenue Service to provide those 
services.  But surely  that  is a small  set of added  costs. 
Nor is the record  keeping  required  of firms  in a reward  TIP inherently 
any more  onerous  than  that  imposed  by the employment  tax credit  or the 
deductibility  rules for entertainment  and travel expenses.  But suppose 
that the Congress  shared  Joseph Pechman's  view that it is an onerous 
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nesses  with, say, less than 20 workers  could qualify  their employees  for 
the reward  with a mere pledge of good faith to restrain  wages, the pro- 
gram  would  lose little  of its effectiveness. 
The basic advantage  of a reward  TIP is that, when businessmen  have 
the  opportunity  to qualify  their  employees  for a tax cut, they  have a strong 
incentive  to translate  that tax cut into a slowdown  of wages.  Because  of 
the rational  self-interest  of employers,  a reward  TIP should have a sig- 
nificant  marginal  effect  on the actual  wages  paid by firms.  After hearing 
the criticisms  made at this conference,  I remain  convinced  that a reward 
TIP on wages  is an entirely  feasible  and manageable  program. 
On the other hand, I am convinced  by criticism,  particularly  from 
Gardner  Ackley, that a price reward  raises severe administrative  prob- 
lems. I was searching  for symmetry  in proposing  that, but the measure- 
ment of prices is not symmetrical  with that of wages. Because price 
measurement  is so complex,  a feature  that  was intended  to assure  workers 
of evenhandedness  might  turn  out to bestow  arbitrary  and unmerited  tax 
cuts  on some  business  firms. 
Any TIP must be built on the foundations  of a social consensus  in 
favor of mutual  deescalation.  It will take a lot of education  and more 
bitter  experience  to convince  a majority  of citizenis  that TIP may be the 
option  that is the least bad. The polls tell us that the American  people- 
union  members,  as much  as any group-detest inflation.  Albert  Rees has 
not told us how labor  leaders  will react  when  they  realize  that  the realistic 
alternative  to TIP is  a series of  recurrent  recessions brought about 
through  monetary  restraint.  The U.S. inflation  rate will be lowered  over 
the  next decade;  the serious  question  is whether  that  is going  to be accom- 
plished  by inefficient  and  inhumane  recessions,  by stifling  price-wage  con- 
trols,  or by some  innovative,  sensible  method  like  TIP. 
General  Discussion 
Charles  Holt pointed  to a new rich body of data that might  be useful 
for simulating  the administrative  problems  of a TIP. The information, 
constructed  largely  for research  purposes  by the unemployment  compen- 
sation system, is basedl  on quarterly  reports  from employers  in thirty- 
seven  states  on the earnings  and  hours  of individual  workers  and is being 
assembled  into a longitudinal  sample. Symposium  523 
Joseph Pechman cautioned Franco Modigliani against coupling an 
excess  profits  tax with a penalty  TIP on wages,  noting  the adverse  experi- 
ence with that  tax during  wartime  periods  and its deservedly  bad reputa- 
tion. 
Alan Greenspan  felt that the conference  had produced  something  ap- 
proaching  a consensus  that the penalty TIP on wages is the form most 
likely to have a reasonable  chance of effectiveness  and administrative 
feasibility.  Yet it was clearly the scheme that was most difficult  to sell 
politically.  George  Perry  agreed  that the administrative  advantages  of a 
penalty  TIP had been emphasized  by many at the conference;  but he did 
not find  the arguments  convincing.  He thought  firms  were  much  less likely 
to cheat  in claiming  rewards  for their  workers  than in  inimizing  liabili- 
ties for penalties  on themselves.  Because  of its universality,  a reward  TIP 
could afford  more  leakages  and still have a larger  total impact  in slowing 
inflation.  Finally,  he was not convinced  that random  audits  from the In- 
ternal  Revenue  Service  were an ineffective  technique  of enforcement  be- 
cause  they seemed  to work  reasonably  for the income  tax as a whole. 
William  Brainard  thought  that  Modigliani's  remarks  about  the distor- 
tions of a TIP raised  many broader  issues. To the extent  that TIP alters 
relative  prices, the consequences  depend on whether (and if so, how) 
inflation  itself distorts  relative  prices, as is frequently  asserted.  Brainard 
shared  Laurence  Seidman's  view  that  TIP would  work  in part  by changing 
expectations.  The resulting  deceleration  of inflation  need not have any 
adverse  allocational  costs. 